As talks of a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah emerge, it’s important to manage expectations by considering a few key factors:
- Similarities in Gaza Ceasefire Talks & Terms
- Battlefield Conditions
- Israel’s Intentions
- US Elections
- Iran and Western Interests
Similarities in Gaza Ceasefire talks
Over the past year in Gaza, we’ve seen ceasefire talks pop up repeatedly, only to fizzle out. Both sides seem to use these discussions more for political maneuvering than for actually reaching an agreement. They keep claiming they’re “close to a deal,” yet they blame each other when things fall apart, insisting that the other side’s demands are unrealistic.
The main sticking point has been Israel’s demand for Hamas to be completely dismantled, and they haven’t shown any willingness to budge on that. Naturally, Hamas isn’t going to agree to that.
The reported draft of the ceasefire conditions presented by Israel includes a clause that permits Israel to take military action within Lebanon against any perceived threats. This resembles the “set up to fail” clauses seen in previous ceasefire negotiations in Gaza further proving Israel has no interest to stop the war.
Battlefield Conditions
Israel currently holds complete air superiority, allowing it to conduct thousands of airstrikes across Lebanon with little to no resistance. According to Israeli sources, they’ve successfully targeted around 80% of Hezbollah’s rocket arsenal.
On the ground in southern Lebanon, there is minimal resistance, with only a few choke points where Hezbollah and IDF clash. The rest of the area is essentially open for the IDF. Numerous videos show IDF tanks moving into Khiyam, while soldiers feel safe enough to cross the border on foot, planting explosives in villages without fear of retaliation from Hezbollah. The media ban limiting coverage to Hezbollah-aligned outlets has contributed to a misleading narrative that Hezbollah is effectively resisting the IDF. In reality, the IDF has successfully employed a strategy of attrition warfare, taking its time to advance and wearing down Hezbollah, resulting in entire villages being reduced to rubble.
Hezbollah has suffered significant losses, with almost every leader, including Hassan Nasrallah and his successor Safiaddine, killed. The new successor, Naim Qassem, has already been threatened. Thousands of Hezbollah’s mid- to high-ranking fighters, including members of the elite Radwan forces, have been injured and are unable to return to the battlefield after the pagers attack. Meanwhile, warehouses containing Hezbollah weapons and military supplies have been destroyed across Lebanon.
These losses have severely impacted the morale of Hezbollah fighters, leading to large desertions, and have raised questions among their support base about Hezbollah’s ability to defend Lebanon as it claimed, especially since they cannot protect their own leadership and critical assets.
The death toll in Lebanon has surpassed 2,865, with nearly half of those casualties occurring in the past month, and 12,772 people injured. In contrast, Israel has reported 107 fatalities, including 41 civilians and 66 soldiers. Damage in Lebanon has exceeded $20 billion, which is more than its entire GDP, while Israel’s GDP has grown from $513.61 billion to $528.07 billion.
Unlike Hamas, Hezbollah does not have any Israeli hostages; however, the IDF has captured multiple Hezbollah fighters, who are now detained in Israel.
While Israel faces rocket attacks, these are manageable and viewed more as an inconvenience than an existential threat. Israel maintains a significant upper hand and full leverage in this conflict.
Israel’s Intentions
Israel has clearly stated that it wants to avoid a repeat of the events of October 7th. This involves not only the complete removal of Hamas but also securing its northern front in Lebanon by disarming Hezbollah. Israel is seeking “guarantees” that there won’t be a recurrence of such an attack, especially since it knows UNSC Resolution 1701 has gone unenforced for the last 18 years. Israel is not waiting for Hezbollah to comply voluntarily, nor does it trust the Lebanese Army to take action against Hezbollah, as evidenced by its reluctance to confront Hezbollah directly.
Given its current upper hand in the conflict and recognizing that the war is already going on, Israel believes that merely relying on UNSC Resolution 1701 is insufficient. Instead, it is pushing for the unofficial enforcement of UNSC Resolution 1559, which calls for the disarmament of all non-state actors in Lebanon, including Hezbollah. This is reflected in Israel’s aggressive actions against Hezbollah’s leadership, arsenal, and logistics.
Israel aims to ensure that Hezbollah is diminished to the point of becoming a small guerrilla group rather than a fully structured organization capable of launching large-scale attacks. With significant gains on the battlefield, it’s unlikely that Israel will halt its progress, allowing Hezbollah to regroup and potentially recreate the circumstances that led to the current war. Israel seeks to pave the way for a post-Hezbollah Lebanon that it believes it can “deal” with.
The US elections
One of the most significant events next week will be the U.S. presidential election, where the world will be watching to see whether Trump or Harris emerges victorious. If Harris wins, we can expect a continuation of the status quo. However, if Trump secures the presidency, Israel may feel empowered to intensify its efforts against Hezbollah before he takes office at the end of January. This could allow Israel to inflict as much damage as possible on Hezbollah, positioning Trump to take credit for ending the conflict upon his inauguration.
We’ve already seen discussions from Trump’s camp about “saving Lebanon,” which suggests an intention to free the country from Hezbollah in pursuit of “lasting peace.”
This context explains the recent rumors about potential ceasefires leading up to the elections. Both sides are likely trying to present themselves favorably in anticipation of the next U.S. president. In reality, we can expect the conflict to escalate aggressively over the next couple of months, as the incoming president will face pressure to bring it to a conclusion.
Iran and Western Interests
The West and the GCC are low-key pleased that Israel is eliminating Hamas and Hezbollah, both of which have been significant sources of trouble for these countries. This is why they are allowing Israel to proceed with minimal accountability, aside from a few public statements. The collective goal of the West and the GCC is to dismantle the entire network of Iranian proxies causing instability in the region and to rein in the Iranian regime itself.
Iran views this situation as leverage in its negotiations, suggesting that it will rein in its proxies’ attacks on Israel and vital shipping routes in exchange for nuclear concessions and the lifting of sanctions. However, Israel cannot accept a nuclear Iran, which is why it aims to weaken Iran’s proxies and diminish their leverage as much as possible ahead of any talks.
In the meantime, Iran is increasing pressure by encouraging its proxies to escalate attacks. It’s clear that Iran is willing to sacrifice its proxies, including Hezbollah, to achieve its broader objectives – a strategy many, including myself, believe is already in motion. The final deal might involve giving up these proxies in exchange for re-engagement with the global community.
Currently, there is little incentive for either side to end the conflict, as both Israel and Iran have vested interests in continuing the war. Even if a ceasefire is achieved, it’s highly unlikely it won’t fall apart quickly after a rocket or 2 is launched.
I will explore potential outcomes and solutions for concluding the war in a future post. If you found this analysis valuable, please share it with your friends and follow this channel for more insights.
